June 29, 2015 § 1 Comment
SCOTUS has spoken in Obergefell v. Hodges, handed down last Friday, making it unlawful for any state to refuse to issue licenses for same-sex marriage (SSM) to persons applying within the state, and making it unlawful for any state to refuse to recognize SSM that was performed legally in another jurisdiction. That pretty well wipes out Mississippi’s position on the issue.
There is a hiccup in Mississippi, however, in that the AG takes the position that, until the 5th Circuit lifts the stay imposed by US Dist. Judge Carlton Reeves in the litigation challenging Mississippi’s law that is on appeal in New Orleans, Mississippi may not issue marriage licenses for SSM.
After that is resolved, however, what impact will Obergefell have on family law in Mississippi? Here are a few of my own opinions:
- Ferguson will still govern equitable distribution, Albright will still govern child custody, the statutes and Huseth will still govern child support, and so on and so on. For the life of me, I do not see any substantive issues that will not be resolved by the familiar substantive rules that are already in place.
- Likewise, our procedures remain the same. Only the gender of the parties is different.
- I heard some lawyers Friday opining that chancery courts need to brace for a flood of divorces from SSM. I don’t get that logic. Oh, I am sure there will be some, but there have to be the marriages first, and my impression is that most gays in Mississippi have been awaiting this development rather than going to other states for SSM, since that other-state marriage would not be recognized under our law anyway.
I think this decision will have the same kind of aftermath as Roe v. Wade. That 1973 case (that’s 42 years ago, for the math-challenged) spawned legislation and litigation that continue to this day as opponents try to probe for a way around it or to ascertain its limits, and proponents try to enforce it. Both Obergefell and Roe v. Wade are substantive due process cases, and those just take longer people to accept, if they ever do.
As with Roe v. Wade, this latest case involves issues that sound in morality and religious teaching, rendering compromise and accommodation much less likely. the role of SCOTUS is to interpret the Constitution, not the Bible. We all know that, and I, for one, prefer for SCOTUS and the other two branches of government to stay out of the Bible-interpretation business. Still, when cases like this fall in that overlap area, they spawn a lot of consternation among the citizenry.
Oh, and as a chancellor, it is my role to apply the law as I am presented with it. That I will do. I have read the majority opinion and the dissents, so I know what is required of me.
As lawyers, you will represent your clients. Those who benefit from the decision whom you take on as clients, as well as those who challenge it.
I have to confess that I was a little surprised at the scope of the decision. I thought the court would say that states must recognize the legal marriages of other states, but that the rules of marriage would be left to the states. That proves, among other things, that I am no constitutional-law scholar.
So, these are my preliminary thoughts. It will be interesting to look back at this 42 years hence — in the unlikely event that I’m still around.
June 22, 2015 § 2 Comments
We’ve talked here before about the principle that, where the parties have consented to allow the chancellor to adjudicate custody, the chancellor may award either party custody, and may award joint custody. That was decided by the MSSC in Crider v. Crider in 2012, and has been elaborated on in cases applying it since.
Does Crider, then, require the chancellor to consider whether joint custody should be awarded before awarding either party sole custody? That was the issue confronting the COA in the case of White v. White, decided June 16, 2015.
Maegan White and Christopher White consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce, with custody of their children, Garrett and Harley, as a contested issue. The chancellor accepted the recommendation of the GAL and awarded sole custody to Christopher, and her opinion made no mention of the possibility or consideration of joint custody. Meagan appealed, arguing that the chancellor’s failure to consider joint custody was error. She contended that Crider and Clark v. Clark, 126 So.3d 122 (Miss. App. 2013) required the judge to consider whether joint custody was in the best interest of the children.
Judge Roberts addressed her argument for the COA:
¶19. Maegan’s interpretation of both Clark and Crider is faulty. In Clark, this Court reversed and remanded a chancellor’s decision to award sole physical custody to the mother, requiring the court to consider the propriety of joint custody on remand. Both parents had requested sole physical custody of their child and submitted the issue to the court for determination. After hearing testimony of the parties, the chancellor had noted: “[In these] kinds of cases . . . it’s hard . . . to give the child to one or the other because everything here would support that. . . . [H]ow can you choose one over the other, but [this court] has to.” Clark, 126 So. 3d at 124-25 (¶10). In reversing the chancery court’s judgment, this Court noted, “Based on our reading of the transcript, it appears that the chancery court may have concluded . . . that it was required to order custody to one parent regardless of whether joint physical custody was in the best interest of [the child].” Id. at 125 (¶12). Noting our concern that the chancery court had incorrectly concluded it was not authorized to consider joint custody, as neither party had requested it, we reversed and remanded for further consideration.
¶20. Similarly, in Crider, parents in an irreconcilable-differences divorce each requested sole custody of their child. The parents submitted the issue of custody to the court for determination. After considering testimony presented and conducting an Albright analysis, the chancellor found that, even though neither parent requested joint custody, it was in the child’s best interest. Thus, she awarded joint custody to the parents for a two-year period. The mother appealed, noting that Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-24(2) (Rev. 2013) [footnote omitted] prohibited a chancellor from awarding joint custody unless specifically requested by the parties. This Court agreed and reversed the chancellor’s judgment, prompting the father to petition for certiorari with the supreme court. After a thorough analysis of the statute and its meaning, the supreme court stated:
It is logical and reasonable that “application of both parties” exists when both parties consent to allowing the court to determine custody. The fact that the parties request that the court determine which parent is to receive “primary custody” does not alter this. The parties are allowing the court to determine what form of custody is in the best interest of the child. If joint custody is determined to be in the best interest of the child using court-specified factors, i.e., the Albright factors, the parties should not be able to prohibit this by the wording of the consent.
Crider, 904 So. 2d at 147 (¶12). The supreme court further noted that the chancellor is in the best position to evaluate the “credibility, sincerity, capabilities and intentions of the parties,” and that it is “incumbent upon a chancellor not to award joint custody” unless in the best interest of the child. Id. at (¶13). The court ultimately held that “when parties consent in writing to the court’s determination of custody, they are consenting and agreeing to that determination and this meets the statutory directive of ‘joint application’ in [section] 93-5-24(2).” Id. at 148 (¶15). Finally, the court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment and noted that a “chancellor may award joint custody in an [irreconcilable-differences] divorce, when the parties request the court to determine custody.” Id. at 148-49 (¶17) (emphasis added).
¶21. Maegan incorrectly interprets both Clark and Crider to require a chancellor to consider joint custody when faced with an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The chancellor “is bound to consider the child’s best interest above all else.” Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996). In both Clark and Crider, the chancellors found joint custody to be in the child’s best interest. In Clark, the chancellor incorrectly awarded sole custody to one parent despite the finding that joint custody was the child’s best interest; in Crider, the chancellor awarded joint custody because that was in the child’s best interest, and the supreme court affirmed that award. Crider and its progeny allow—not require—a chancellor to award joint custody when in the best interest of the child. In the present case, the chancellor found that it was in Garrett and Harley’s best interest to give custody to [Christopher]. Though the chancellor’s order makes no mention of joint custody, he is not required to do so. The chancellor’s primary duty is to consider the best interests of the children and make a determination of custody based on that concern. There is no evidence that the chancellor disregarded the children’s best interests when determining custody. The chancellor’s custody award to [Christopher] was not error.
Not much to add to that, except to cite you to this post on Easley v. Easley, and this one with some random thoughts on joint custody, which might make your collection of authorities on this point complete.
June 16, 2015 § Leave a comment
If the title of this post is not a legitimate Latin legal maxim, it should be, because it captures the essence of an important principle of extra-judicial modification. The above can be translated as “You don’t always get what you bargained for.”
That most certainly was true in the case of Patrick and Lesa Deckard, who were divorced from each other in 2003. The divorce judgment required Patrick to pay Lesa $1,200 per month as support for their two children.
Soon after the divorce one of the children went to live with the paternal grandparents. Patrick contended that he and Lesa agreed between them that the child support would be reduced to $800 a month, and then later to $600 a month. Yet another, later, agreement had Patrick paying child support of $700 a month, the amount of private school tuition. Lesa took the position that Patrick dictated what he would pay by claiming it was all he could afford; she pointed out also that Patrick never paid the amounts in question, anyway. Patrick did not produce any evidence of any extra-judicial agreements.
The chancellor found Patrick in contempt and awarded Lesa judgments totaling around $114,000 for unpaid child support, unpaid medical expenses of the children, and attorney’s fees. The judge also ordered Patrick to pay $800 in child support from that point on. Patrick appealed.
In the case of Deckard v. Deckard, decided June 2, 2015, the COA affirmed, Judge Ishee’s opinion laid out the rationale:
¶6. In the judgment of divorce issued by the chancery court on December 18, 2003, Patrick was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,200 per month. In the order dated March 6, 2014, Patrick was found to be in contempt for his failure to pay $107,013 in child support from 2005–2014. Patrick argues that the amount claimed is too high because their oldest son, Taylor, moved in with his paternal grandparents soon after the divorce.
¶7. Patrick asserts that allowing Lesa to collect child support from Patrick for Taylor’s benefit would be unjust enrichment because “for all practical intents and purposes he had never been in Lesa Deckard’s home and she never expended any monies for child support for his use and benefit.” However, the chancellor disagreed and found that Patrick owed the amount ordered by the original agreement to Lesa in unpaid child support. In doing so, the chancellor quoted the following from Smith v. Smith, 20 So. 3d 670, 674 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. 2009) (citations omitted):
The law remains firm that court-ordered child-support payments vest in the child as they accrue and may not thereafter be modified or forgiven, only paid. But this does not mean that equity may not at times suggest ex post facto approval of extra judicial adjustments in the manner and form in which support payments have been made. The noncustodial parent may be entitled to credit for any additional support which he/she has evinced by satisfactory proof to the trial court.
. . . .
In a contempt action concerning past-due child support, when the custodial parent introduces evidence that the noncustodial parent who is required to pay the support has failed to do so, a prima facie case of contempt has been made. At this point, the burden falls on the defending party, to avoid a finding of contempt, to prove that there was payment or other defense, and this proof must be “clear and convincing and rise above a state of doubtfulness.”
¶8. The chancellor found that while Taylor was living with Patrick’s parents, Patrick did not contribute any money or financial assistance in any manner to his parents for Taylor’s benefit. Accordingly, the chancellor found that there was not any evidence before the court that would allow Patrick to receive a credit for any child-support payments.
¶9. Although Patrick cites the case of Brewer v. Holliday, 135 So. 3d 117 (Miss. 2014), to support his position, the facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Brewer. In Brewer, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellor’s finding that a man was not entitled to a credit for the amount of child support he had paid to his ex-wife for the period of time in which their son did not live with her. Brewer, 135 So. 3d at 121 (¶16). However, the chancellor only agreed to the credit because the son had been living with his father while his father was still paying the mother child support for him. Id.
¶10. In the instant case, Taylor was living with Patrick’s parents, and Patrick admits that there is no evidence that he contributed any money to his parents for Taylor’s expenses. “Whether or not a non-custodial parent should be given credit against his/her child support obligation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the chancellor.” Strack v. Sticklin, 959 So. 2d 1, 5 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). As such, we agree with the chancery court that Patrick is in contempt for his failure to pay $107,013 in child support.
Oh, and Patrick overlooked the fact that when child support is global (i.e., one amount for all children, as opposed to a specified amount per child), the fact that one child is no longer entitled to support (e.g., due to emancipation), it does not necessarily result in a reduction in the total amount of child support.
And on the issue of the enforceability of the extra-judicial agreements, the COA first pointed out that the evidence was in dispute as to whether there were ever any such agreements, and then made this observation:
¶13. “No party obligated by a judicial decree to provide support for minor children may resort to self help and modify his or her obligation with impunity.” Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226, 1231 (Miss. 1993) (citation omitted). “A party making an extra-judicial modification does so at his own peril.” Id. (citation omitted). Because there is no evidence of an extrajudicial agreement, we affirm the chancery court’s findings that Patrick is in contempt for $107,013 for unpaid child support.
An especially good lawyer will sit down with her client in the aftermath of a divorce, or custody, or child-support case and carefully explain that people quite often will try to reach all kinds of handshake agreements later — whether out of a desire to avoid more bloodshed and hard feelings, or to avoid the pain of more attorney’s fees, or from exhaustion — and those kinds of agreement are fraught with peril. Better to get some legal advice and a court order before changing what the court ordered.
June 2, 2015 § Leave a comment
This is from a PSA entered into between Joe Bryant and his then-wife, Adella Jones:
[Adella] will receive as property settlement fifty percent (50%) of [Joe’s] disposable retirement from the Unites States Marine Corps/Army National Guard and fifty percent [50%] of [Joe’s] disposable retirement from the Veterans Administration which will be paid directly to [Adella] by the United States Marine Corps/Army National Guard and the Veterans Administration.
Joe retired from the VA on November 1, 2008, and from the military on June 30, 2010, and began receiving 100% of his retirement from both. He never paid any of the amounts received to Adella.
In October, 2010, Adella submitted her application for her retirement benefits, unaware whether Joe had retired, and she began receiving her one-half in January, 2011.
After Joe had filed a futile modification action, and she learned that he had begun receiving 100% of his retirement benefits for a time before she received any, Adella filed a contempt action against Joe.
Following a trial, the chancellor ruled that it was the military, and not Joe, that was required to make the payments, and, therefore, that he was not in contempt. The judge did award Adella a judgment against Joe for one-half of the retirement he had received in the interim in the amount of $46,433. Adella appealed.
On April 7, 2015, the COA affirmed in Jones v. Bryant. Judge Carlton’s for a unanimous court explained:
¶15. In the July 2, 2013 order granting Adella’s motion to dismiss [Joe’s pleading for modification], the chancellor found that “after reviewing the property settlement agreement, . . . the provisions regarding military retirement are clear and unambiguous and should not be modified.” The chancellor later entered a final judgment on August 8, 2013, further holding that “the property settlement agreement requires Adella’s portion of the retirement to be paid by the United States Marine Corps/Army National Guard and the Veterans Administration rather than by Joe,” and as a result, “Joe is not in willful and contumacious contempt of the agreement.” We find Adella presented no evidence to support her claims that Joe willfully or intentionally violated any court order. The record reflects that the plain language of the property-settlement agreement in this case provides that Adella’s portion of Joe’s military retirement pay would be paid directly to her by the Marine Corps/Army National Guard and Veterans Administration.
¶16. The Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) provides former spouses, who are awarded a portion of military retirement pay in a divorce, with “a mechanism to enforce retired pay as property award by direct payments from the member’s retired pay.” See Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.dfas.mil/garnishment/usfspa/faqs.html; 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). [Footnote omitted] The former spouse must complete and provide the required applications, relevant court order, and supporting documentation, as required by statute and regulations, to the designated Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the language in the property award must also comply. [Footnote omitted]
¶17. After our review of the record, we find substantial evidence exists in the record to support the chancellor’s final judgment determining Joe was not in willful and contumacious contempt of the property-settlement agreement or any other court order. Accordingly, we also find no error in the chancellor’s denial of attorney’s fees to Adella. See Henderson v. Henderson, 952 So. 2d 273, 280 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
How can you avoid a similar result for your client?
- Any duty that you want to be enforceable later in favor of your client needs to spelled out. Here, it would have been simple to spell out that Joe had the duty to notify Adella in writing within a specified time of his retirement. For example, he could have been required to send her a copy of his application for benefits simultaneously with its submission to the agency.
- Whenever a contract requires third-party payments on behalf of A, specify that A will be responsible to make the agreed payments himself to B until the third party begins making them. For instance, “Joe will pay one-half of any retirement benefits received by him directly to Adella until such time as the [agency] begins withholding her 50% portion” or words to that effect.
- You might want to read that Department of Defense material and incorporate some of it verbatim in your PSA. Agencies understand their own jargon better than yours or the court’s.
- Is it in your client’s interest to spell out whether the retirement is being paid as property division on the one hand, or as alimony on the other? It might be; you need to consider it.
- Know and understand how the retirement system works. Read the interpretive material. Study the website. Draft your PSA from a position of knowledge, not guesswork.
May 13, 2015 § 2 Comments
Two things are true when it comes to valuation of the marital estate in equitable distribution: (1) The date selected for valuation can be critical; and (2) Selection of the date of valuation is in the discretion of the chancellor.
The recent COA decision in McKissack v. McKissack, handed down May 5, 2015, illustrated both points.
Billy Stephen McKissack and Terri McKissack had consented to a divorce on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences, and left equitable distribution up to the chancellor. The judge entered a divorce judgment in November, 2008, ruling that some $542,000 in CD’s in Billy Stephen’s name were marital property. Billy Stephen appealed, and the COA reversed and remanded on October 12, 2010, holding that the CD’s were separate property. The chancellor was charged to reconfigure the equitable distribution based on the COA ruling.
On remand, the chancellor did adjust the equitable distribution to accommodate the COA ruling. He found that the financial disparity created by the half-million-dollar separate estate could not be made up by allocating assets, and so ordered Billy Stephen to pay Terri lump-sum alimony to make up the difference. He also left the original asset allocation for the most part intact. In making his ruling, the chancellor used the date of the original divorce judgment as the valuation date, and he relied on his previous ruling to Billy Stephen again appealed, complaining that the chancellor used the original divorce-hearing date for valuation, instead of a post-appeal, later date.
The reason Billy Stephen urged the later date is that he had acquired new debt since the date of the original divorce, the largest of which was a debt he had co-signed with his paramour for an apartment complex that had subsequently been destroyed in a fire.
In the case of McKissack v. McKissack, decided May 5, 2015, the COA affirmed. Here’s how Judge Maxwell, writing for the majority, addressed Billy Stephen’s arguments:
¶9. As Steve sees it, the chancellor’s distribution of marital assets was “unfair” because he gave too little weight to Steve’s newly acquired debt from the apartment fire. He also insists the chancellor should have conducted a Ferguson analysis anew on remand and improperly skimped on the Cheatham factors. After review, we find no error in the chancellor’s methodology.
I. Equitable Distribution After Remand
¶10. There are three general tasks required of a chancellor’s division of marital assets in divorce cases. The chancellor must “(1) classify the parties’ assets as marital or separate, (2) determine the value of those assets, and (3) divide the marital estate equitably based upon the factors set forth in Ferguson.” Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52 So. 3d 430, 436 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted) (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994)) [Footnote omitted]. We review a chancellor’s equitable division under the familiar manifest-error standard of review. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 56 So. 3d 1283, 1288 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
A. Newly Acquired Debt
¶11. To Steve, his losses from the apartment fire were reason enough to not have to pay additional lump-sum alimony. And he argues it was wrong for the chancellor not to have re-valued the marital estate, giving more weight to his newly acquired, non-marital debt from the apartment fire.
¶12. But on remand, the chancellor opted to use the property values already “in evidence at the trial on the merits”—rightly noting that the “date of valuation is discretionary with the court.” Because he had already valued the property as of the divorce hearing date when making his findings, he found “any accumulation of additional assets or the appreciation of awarded assets should be classified as separate property[.]” Steve urges it was wrong for the chancellor to use the divorce hearing date as the “point of demarcation for valuation.”
B. Valuation Date
¶13. Steve’s argument is blunted by the fact that chancellors are given deference in setting the valuation date for equitable distribution of marital property. Holdeman v. Holdeman, 34 So. 3d 650, 654 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Often chancellors deem the date of the divorce hearing or judgment as the line of demarcation. See Wheat v. Wheat, 37 So. 3d 632, 637 (¶15) (Miss. 2010). The date of entry of a separate maintenance order or temporary support order may also serve as the valuation date. Id. (citing Godwin v. Godwin, 758 So. 2d 384, 386 (¶7) (Miss. 1999)). But this deference is measured against the general notion that “assets should be valued as close to the trial date as feasible.” Debbie Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 6.07 (2005).
¶14. The trial-date approach is the route the chancellor took here. He made a common-sense decision that the date of the divorce hearing would be the cut-off point. He held any later-accumulated assets or appreciation of already-awarded assets would be separate property. See Henderson v. Henderson, 757 So. 2d 285, 293 (¶37) (Miss. 2000) (On remand, the supreme court held a husband’s one-half interest in the marital home should be valued from the divorce date—not several years after the case had been appealed and retried, during which time the wife had been paying the mortgage on an appreciating asset). The chancellor was, however, aware of authority that post-divorce passive appreciation of asset values could be included [Footnote omitted]. But he found no proof of passive appreciation here.
¶15. What Steve largely overlooks is that his preferred valuation date cuts both ways. It is true the chancellor gave little weight to Steve’s newly acquired debt for valuation purposes. But he also refrained from tampering with Steve’s possibly new assets—though he perceived Steve’s income was greater and his expenses lower than when the couple divorced. Also, the chancellor highlighted that the resulting debt from the apartment fire was not from Terri’s wrongdoing or fault. The apartment was Steve’s separate property. And it was Steve who chose to sign as guarantor for his claimed paramour Millie’s debt in the complex. For these reasons, and those we explain below, we cannot say the chancellor erred in relying more on his initial valuations than Steve’s new debt.
The court went on to uphold the chancellor’s decision to rely on his original Ferguson analysis.
One thing that Billy Stephen apparently did was to put on proof of his preferred valuation date and the reasons supporting it. I have held forth here before about that failure of many attorneys in equitable distribution cases to put on any proof whatsoever in trials of the client’s position on what valuation date is selected. When you do that you are: (a) leaving it entirely in the judge’s unfettered discretion; and (b) depriving your client of a basis in the record to complain about it on appeal.
Every calculation involved in equitable distribution revolves around the valuation date. Remember that.
May 12, 2015 § 1 Comment
If a husband and wife came into your office and wanted you to represent them both in an ID divorce, what would you say? I think, and would hope, that the vast majority of us would decline on ethical grounds and offer to represent only one, not both.
How would it work, anyway, to represent both parties? You could put them in separate rooms and shuttle between. You could run to one room and advise the husband against agreeing to pay any alimony, and then run to another room and advise the wife to hold out until the husband agrees to alimony. Absurd? I’ll say.
Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.7 precludes representation of opposing parties in litigation unless certain conditions are met. Ethics Opinion number 80 of the Bar issued March 25, 1983, makes it clear that joint representation in an irreconcilable differences divorce is unethical:
The Committee is, therefore, of the opinion that the representation of both parties to a no-fault divorce violates the Rule 1.7, MRPC, and that it is, therefore, unethical for a lawyer to undertake such multiple representation.
How to handle it is set out in this language of the Opinion:
There is nothing wrong at all with one of the parties to a No-Fault Divorce being without an attorney, so long as that party, either H or W is properly informed by the spouse’s attorney that (1) that party is not represented by the spouse’s attorney, (2) the spouse’s attorney will not undertake to advise that party on any aspect of the case as to his or her rights, and (3) that party has a right to obtain an attorney to advise him or her and to review any of the agreements, pleadings or decrees which will be prepared. See Rule 4.3, MRPC.
A recent COA case involved dual representation and a challenged outcome. Leta Collins and Kenneth Collins were divorced from each other in 2011. They had filed a joint complaint for divorce on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences. The pleading stated that “The parties together have been represented by [Name of the Attorney], and was signed by that attorney as “Counsel for Leta D. Collins and Kenneth J. Collins.” In the PSA, which was approved by the court, Leta relinquished all interest in Kenneth’s financial assets and retirement.
More than a year later, Leta discovered that she had not known of more than $500,000 in financial assets that Kenneth had at the time of the divorce. She filed a R60 motion, but she did not allege that a fraud had been committed. The chancellor denied the motion, and Leta appealed.
In the case of Collins v. Collins, decided May 5, 2015, the COA affirmed. Judge Fair wrote this for the court:
¶24. Leta argues that the marital property was not equitably distributed because she and Kenneth were represented by the same attorney during the divorce. She alleges that her lack of independent advice and counsel led her to sign the unfair PSA.
¶25. The joint complaint for divorce states “[t]he parties together have been represented by M. Chadwick Smith,” and it was signed by Smith as “attorney for” both parties. Leta testified she and Kenneth believed they were represented by the same attorney. Leta argues this was a direct violation of Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits representation of “a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client,” unless certain conditions are met.
¶26. The chancellor addressed this issue in her findings from the bench, stating that
when Mr. Chadwick Smith came in with his document, the final decree, I inquired of him who he represented because the divorce had the words that Ms. Collins’[s] counsel very ably draws to attention, that he represented both. And he stated, “I only prepared the paperwork, Judge. That’s what it says on there, ‘Prepared by.’” Only after the assurances of Mr. Chad Smith did I accept the parties’ divorce, and I signed the same on the 8th day of June 2011. Thus the allegations that Ms. Collins seeks to present that Mr. Collins committed a fraud on this court are fundamentally vested against Mr. Chad Smith.
¶27. Leta testified that she was the one who had actually prepared the PSA, based on her prior divorce papers, with some contributions from Kenneth. Kenneth likewise testified that Smith did not make any decisions for them. As the chancellor found, if Smith violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in dual representation, it was not a sufficient basis to modify the divorce decree. This issue is without merit.
What saved the attorney here apparently was that the parties had specifically waived financial disclosures, and it was Leta, and not the lawyer, who prepared the PSA. Both parties acknowledged that the lawyer gave them no advice at all. It did not help Leta’s cause, if you read the rest of the opinion, that it took her a year and some months to seek the court’s assistance.
A few thoughts:
- Don’t let anything about the peculiar facts in this case mislead you into believing it’s ever okay to represent both parties in an ID divorce. It’s not. Ever. It’s unethical. And if it’s unethical, it can cost you professionally. Don’t do it. Ever.
- Any lawyer who states on a joint complaint for divorce that he represents both parties is asking for trouble. That in and of itself is a statement admitting an ethical violation.
- I must be getting old (and I admit I am), but I am seeing more and more of people with JD after their names taking the position that “I only drafted papers for the parties,” or “I simply typed and submitted what they gave me,” or “this is what the client insists on doing.” Whatever happened to lawyers (JD’s) as counselors at law? Have lawyers gone from being legal advisors and guides to being high-priced clerk-typists? What is the point of having a lawyer when anyone with a word-processing program and a laptop can produce pleadings and an agreement? What is the point of having a lawyer if it is not to obtain legal advice? This trend, particularly among young people with JD after their names troubles me greatly. Notice that I said “JD after their names” and not lawyers. Just because you have JD after your name does not make you a lawyer. What makes you a lawyer is representing, protecting, and looking after the legal interests of a client. If all you’re doing is being a paying customer’s stooge, or acting as their clerk-typist, all you are is a JD, not a lawyer.
- In this case, the parties themselves acquiesced in this awkward arrangement, which created an excuse for it under MRPC. Had they not, I think Ms. Collins had a legitimate beef, and maybe a viable lawsuit against their joint lawyer. But although it gets the lawyer out of this particular bind, I don’t think that the parties’ acquiescence can excuse this ethical breach. The lawyer, not the parties. has the higher duty and is ethically bound.
- If you ever draft a joint complaint, make doubly, triply sure that you make it clear which party you represent, and that you have not, and will not provide the unrepresented party with any legal advice, and that she has the right to have attorney advise him or her and to review any of the agreements, pleadings or decrees which will be prepared.
- Better yet: never, ever, ever, ever file a joint complaint for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
- And, for Pete’s sake, be an attorney and advise your client. That’s what you went to law school for.
- Play fast and loose with the ethical rules and you are playing with dynamite.
May 6, 2015 § 2 Comments
Suzie drops by, writes you a check for your retainer and court costs, and fills you in on the terms of the parties’ agreement to get an irreconcilable differences divorce. She hands you a folded sheet of notebook paper with bullet points that read like, ” … Joe will get his truck and pay for it, and I will get my car and pay for it,” and ” … Joe will pay me $5,000 from his retirement account,” and “Suzie will get 1/2 of Joe’s retirement with Ajax Lightning Rod Corp.”
So, what do you do next?
If your answer was to hand the paper to your secretary to start working on a draft, you are wrong. As in deeply, malpracticedly wrong.
The correct answer is that you need a LOT more information before you commence that draft. Consider:
- What kind of retirement account is the $5,000 going to come from, and when it is it to be paid? If the account is a defined contribution plan, such as IRA or 401(k), a lump sum can be paid if done properly. If, on the other hand, it is a defined benefit plan, such as most pension plans, she could only get the money in the form of an income stream at the time of Joe’s eligibility for retirement.
- If that retirement plan that is going to fund the lump-sum payment is PERS or military retirement, you can’t dip into it to withdraw cash. The only way to access PERS benefits is to retire and begin drawing a monthly benefit, or to leave employment and get a cash payout.
- What are the actual names of the retirement accounts? You are asking for trouble if you don’t use the exact name of the accounts, such as “Ajax Lightning Rod Corp. Employee Benefit Program 51-014,” or “Joe Blow IRA Account no. 700-092108, Skinflint Bank & Trust, Lucedale, MS.” Why? Because people have a tendency years after the fact to lose their memory of exactly what it was they agreed to do, and that detail nails down exactly what that agreement was. Not only that, but later when you draft any necessary QDRO, you will need that exact information.
- Do not lift a finger to draft that PSA until you hold in your hand the most recent statements from all of the retirement accounts. Just because someone tells you they can do something does not mean they can. Also, those statements will have most, if not all, of the information you will need to draft the retirement provisions of the PSA.
- Make sure you specify the exact date of division. For example, “Suzie shall receive an amount equal to one-half of the account balance as of January 15, 2015 …” The date by which the division is to be accomplished is also critical.
- Spell out who has the responsibility to do what. If Joe is to accomplish all of this, make sure the agreement says that. If someone is going to hire a financial advisor or lawyer to draft a QDRO, who will pay the expense? Some plans actually charge fees — as much as several hundred dollars — to process divisions. Who will pay?
- Address who will bear the tax responsibility for his or her share of the division. Remember that IRA and 401(k) divisions are taxed as income, plus a 10% penalty. If that $5,000 payment is made, will Suzie’s share be reduced by 38%, or will Joe bear that burden? Remember that Suzie can avoid any taxes by rolling the money over into her own qualified account.
The most recent object lesson in how not to handle a retirement division is in the case of Miles v. Miles, about which I posted at the link. You don’t want that to happen to you. As I said before, you need to educate yourself about retirement accounts and put some thought into the most effective way to draft a provision that will protect your client and successfully accomplish what she wants to do.
Some of the information in this post is derived from a presentation by Michael D. James of Legacy Wealth Management Group, Hattiesburg, to the Conference of Chancery Judges in April.
April 6, 2015 § Leave a comment
Two recent COA decisions are flip sides of the same coin that you can not get a divorce on the ground of HCIT unless it is supported by substantial, corroborated proof.
The COA affirmed the chancellor’s R41(b) dismissal of a divorce action in Pittman v. Pittman, handed down March 24, 2015. Judge James expounded for the unanimous court:
¶11. A party seeking a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment bears the burden of proving his ground by a preponderance of the evidence. Hoskins v. Hoskins, 21 So. 3d 705, 707 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). We have defined habitual cruel and inhuman treatment as:
Conduct that . . . either (1) “endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief”[;] or (2) “is so unnatural and infamous” as to make the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance.
Id. (quoting Kumar v. Kumar, 976 So. 2d 957, 961 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). In addition, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “[h]abitual cruel and inhuman treatment may be established only by a continuous course of conduct . . . . [S]uch conduct must be habitual, that is, done often enough or so continuously that it may reasonably be said to be a permanent condition.” Holladay v. Holladay, 776 So. 2d 662, 677 (¶64) (Miss. 2000). Thus, the evidence required to support granting a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment requires “more than mere unkindness, rudeness, or incompatibility.” Id.
¶12. In granting Ty’s motion for an involuntary dismissal, the chancellor, viewing the evidence fairly, found that the evidence presented did not meet the elements of cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor noted that, although Propst [the wife] claimed that Ty [the husband] forced her into bankruptcy, Propst testified that she was represented by counsel. The chancellor found there was no evidence that Ty coerced Propst into bankruptcy. As to physical abuse, the chancellor noted that Propst made general allegations of abuse without specificity, except regarding the occasion in which Ty grabbed her from behind when she attempted to leave his house with important papers and the occasion outside Propst’s accountant’s office when Ty forcefully took papers from Propst. However, the chancellor noted that at no time were the police called, nor were medical records produced documenting abuse.
¶13. “This Court must give great deference to the factual findings of the chancellor that are supported by substantial evidence.” Wilbourne v. Wilbourne, 748 So. 2d 184, 187 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Upon reviewing the record of the proceedings below, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that Propst is not entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Propst failed to demonstrate a continuous course of conduct that was so unkind, unfeeling, or brutal as to endanger her, or put her in reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health. Gallaspy v. Gallaspy, 459 So. 2d 283, 285 (Miss. 1984). Furthermore, many of her complaints were uncorroborated, except the incident at the Barn that was corroborated by Tyler. Nevertheless, even if taken as true, the complained of incidents are remote and isolated events and fail to rise to the level of conduct that is habitual or so continuous that it may reasonably be said to be a permanent condition.
¶14. We agree with the chancellor that the parties likely have irreconcilable differences; however, “mere incompatibility is not enough to show habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” Id. “Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is not the catch-all category to permit a divorce . . . [and,] [a]bsent an agreement . . . that would permit an irreconcilable differences divorce, neither party is entitled to be granted a divorce without providing the proof necessary to support the grounds that are alleged.” Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 767 So. 2d 272, 276 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by dismissing Propst’s complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. This issue is without merit.
The other case is Walker v. Walker, also decided March 24, 2015. In that case, the COA reversed the chancellor’s ruling that granted a divorce, finding that it was unsupported by substantial evidence, and that the evidence was uncorroborated.
The takeaway is that you need to be sure that the conduct complained of was: (a) habitual, meaning regularly recurring and not isolated incidents; and (2) cruel and inhuman, meaning more than unkindness, with a discernible effect on the complaining party. And there must be corroboration. And all of that is at a minimum. There are some wrinkles, so before you go crashing off into court on an HCIT case, be sure to research the case law.
March 2, 2015 § 3 Comments
The MSSC has the gay-marriage issue before it, as does the SCOTUS.
Last Thursday the Mississippi court issued an order calling for more briefing and indicating that it may well stay the Mississippi appeal until the SCOTUS can rule.
You can read the MSSC order in the case of Czekala-Chatham v. State of Miss. for yourself, with objecting opinions, but here is what the court wants briefed:
In light of Mississippi’s public policy of not allowing or recognizing a marriage between two persons of the same gender, what rational basis supports the interpretation or application of a law or constitutional provision so as to prohibit Mississippi courts from granting a divorce to a Mississippi resident who was lawfully married in another state to a person of the same gender?
So, what does this portend?
The only clear indication is in the three objections: Chandler clearly would uphold the Mississippi laws; King and Kitchens would not.
Oh, and the other pretty clear direction in this case is that it apparently will be sidetracked to let the feds decide the issue. Justice King decries that as a dereliction of duty.
It’s an interesting case. Stay tuned.
February 12, 2015 § 3 Comments
The COA case Miles v. Miles, handed down January 27, 2015, is a study in how not to draft a PSA.
Carlos and Brenda Miles had gotten an irreconcilable-differences divorce in 2000. The PSA included the following language:
“[Carlos] shall place [Brenda’s] name on his Individual Retirement Account (IRA) Certificate of Deposit at [the] Bank of Mississippi, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.”
When Carlos went to do what the language required of him, he was spurned by the bank because an IRA (note that the I stands for Individual, not joint) can only be in the name of the owner; there is no such thing as a jointly-owned IRA.
A dozen years later, Brenda had to go back to court to get the chancellor to re-jigger the arrangement to get what she should have been entitled to in the first place. That’s a second trip to court, with a second set of attorney’s fees and separate time away from work and other lifely activities to set right what could have been addressed in 2000 with effective language in the PSA.
Aside from the glaring fact that the agreement required the parties to do the impossible, it also failed to set out the balance in the account, or to state that each party was to own one-half (or any other percentage), or to establish who would have the tax responsibility. No date was set to carry out the agreement.
When you draft a PSA, don’t just take your client’s notes and couch them in legalese sufficient to pass your judge’s scrutiny. Engage your brain and bring your training, background, and experience to bear for the benefit of your client.
Your responsibility, as a competent lawyer, is to draft an agreement in such a way that it will do everything it is supposed to do with the result that your client intended, without any court ever having to guess what the language meant. That is a lofty responsibility, and to do it right requires a thoughtful, careful approach. Slapping some words together on a page to satisfy a client today will only buy that client grief and resentment against you later (hopefully after the statute of limitations has run).
If you approach every agreement you draft with this responsibility in mind, you will not achieve the goal 100% of the time. No lawyer is perfect. But if you aim for 100%, your success rate will be considerably better than most other attorneys, and unquestionably better than that of the word-slappers.
The needless train wreck in this case could have been avoided if the agreement had said that the IRA would be divided, one-half each (or even better, stating specific amounts), and that hers would be deposited (or rolled over) into her own qualified account, and that each party would be responsible for the tax consequences associated with his or her own share of the account.
If you don’t understand how these things work, I suggest you refer these type clients to someone who can do a competent job.